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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James Rhoads was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony DUI and felony
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent (i.e., joyriding).

Mr. Rhoads asserts

that the district court erred in allowing a witness to testify to a hearsay statement as an
"excited utterance."

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Rhoads' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay statements of a codefendant/accomplice where the remarks did not fall under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did Not Fall
Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule
A.

Introduction
The district court erred in admitting Ms. Holland's alleged statement to

Mr. Rhoads regarding who wrecked the car, through the testimony of Mr. Guryan,
because the remarks occurred a substantial period of time after the accident as
Mr. Guryan saw Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads walking up Bogus Basin Road, and the
car was not immediately in sight. Although the district court found the fact that both
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were covered in mud persuasive to establish the recency
of the accident, the presence of mud on one's clothing is not synonymous with a
specific length of time. Further, Ms. Holland and Mr. Roads were found some distance
from the vehicle and were described as acting calm, indicating both that they had been
walking up the road for quite some time and they had time to reflect on the accident.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did
Not Fall Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule
During the testimony of Mr. Guryan, the State sought to introduce a statement

allegedly

made

by

Ms.

Holland

to

Mr.

Rhoads

as

they

approached

Mr. Guryan. Mr. Guryan overheard Ms. Holland say, "I can't believe you wrecked soand-so's car." Defense counsel objected (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.18-20), but the district
court found that because Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were still covered in mud from
coming up the hill, the statement was "contemporaneous" with the accident (Trial
Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13). However, the district court erred in relying on this fact to determine
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the time between the accident and the encounter with Mr. Guyran as there was mud
found both inside the vehicle and on the clothing of Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads, which
discredits the district court's theory that the two individuals only became muddy after
climbing up the embankment onto the road to seek assistance. (Defendant's Ex., C, 0.)
Clearly the two individuals had become muddy, and then gotten back into the car at
some point. Further, Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were found some distance from the
vehicle and were described as acting as if everything were fine, indicating both that they
had been walking up the road for quite some time and they had time to reflect on the
accident. (Trial Tr., p.337, L.20 - p.339, L.14.)
As set forth in Appellant's Brief, under I.R.E. 803(2) a "statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition" may come in under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule. I.R.E. 803(2) (emphasis added). It is well established that in order to
fall within this exception, there must be a startling event which renders inoperative the
normal reflective thought process of the observer, and the declarant's statement must
be a spontaneous reaction to that even rather than the result of reflective thought.

State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4 (1986); State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 873, 876 (Ct. App.
2004); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325 (Ct. App. 1999).
In State v. Griffith, the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between
the event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was
volunteered or made in response to a question.

State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 362-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
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Even a five to ten minute interval can be far enough removed in time to disqualify
the statement as an excited utterance. See State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323 (Ct. App.
1999) (holding that the district court committed error in admitting the declarant/victim's
remarks through the testimony of a police officer, because the remarks were not
"excited utterances," when there was a ten-minute interval between the end of the
declarant's fight with the defendant and making the statements); see also State v.
Burian, 115 Idaho 1154 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the district court did not err in

excluding evidence offered by defense counsel under the "excited utterance" exception
to the hearsay rule when there was a five-minute interval between the end of the
declarant/defendant's fight with the victims and making the statements).

In affirming

the defendant's conviction, the Burian Court noted that the "excited utterance" exception
to the hearsay rule "has two requirements. First there must be a startling event which
renders inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer. Second,
the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the
result of reflective thought." Id. at 1156. The Court of Appeals stated that the district
court found that the second requirement had not been met, noting that: (1) the
statement was detached by time and distance from the events; and (2) the statement
was self-serving. Id. Therefore, the circumstances did not point to any '"special
reliability"' that would entitle the defendant's statement to be admitted under I.R.E.
803(2). Id.
The Hansen Court held that in determining whether a statement falls within the
excited utterance exception:
[t]he circumstances to be considered include the amount of time that
elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the
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condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or
made in response to a question.
Id. at 325. In vacating the judgment of conviction and remanding the case for a new

trial, the Court primarily reasoned that: (1) the ten minute gap between the conclusion
of the delcarant's fight with the defendant and her arrival at the police station was
sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication; (2) the declarant's anger with the
defendant could have provided an incentive to concoct or embellish her description of
the confrontation to the police officer; (3) the statements were not an expletive or burst
of words in abrupt response to a shocking event, but an extensive narration of the fight;
and (4) the declarant was not a child, but rather an adult woman. Id. at 326-27.
Therefore, the statements did not carry the indicia of reliability envisioned by I.RE.
803(2). Id. at 326.

Here, as the State pointed out in its brief, it is not clear what length of time
elapsed from the car wreck to the point on the road where Mr. Guyran encountered
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads. Thus the facts in the record and witness testimony must
be used to establish an approximate period of time between the wreck and
Ms. Holland's statement in front of Mr. Guyran. What we do know about the timeline in
this case is that

(1) In between the time of the accident and the time Mr. Guryan

overheard Ms. Holland's statement about wrecking the car, Ms. Holland had climbed out
of the car, perhaps made some attempts to free the car, scrambled up a muddy
embankment, and began walking/staggering down the road 1;

(2) Mr. Guryan saw

Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads walking on the side of the road, but testified that he did not

1

(Trial Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.263, L.10, p.337, Ls.15-22, p.346, Ls.16-19, p.348, Ls.3-7.)
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initially see the car, "[w]e just saw two people" 2 ;

(3) Mr. Guryan said that the two

individuals had one shoe between them-like they had lost some shoes trying to get up
the embankment3 ; and (4) Mr. Guryan's description of the situation was not one of a
state of urgency or emergency-he testified that although the two individuals were
missing some shoes and were quite muddy, they "popped back up and said, 'Oh, we
are fine. Everything is good."' 4
The district court failed to consider that the statement was made by one of only
two people in the car who could have been driving. A comment as to who was driving in
front of the first witness they encountered was a self-serving statement by Ms. Holland,
and therefore should not fall under the "excited utterance" hearsay exception.

See

Burton, 115 Idaho at 1156.

Ms. Holland's statement was not a spontaneous reaction to the accident, but was
the result of reflective thought. Here, like the statement in Hansen, Ms. Holland had
sufficient time after the accident for reflective thought and fabrication.

Notably,

Ms. Holland had time to construct a story with Mr. Rhoads that identified a fictitious
person named "Jeff" as the driver of the car.

(Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.)

Since

Ms. Holland had ample time to reflect and discuss the fabrication of a fictitious driver,
she also had sufficient time to reflect on the accident such that the statement was
clearly not an "excited utterance."

Further, the circumstances in this case do not

indicate any '"special reliability'" about Ms. Holland's statement, and in fact indicate that

2
3

4

(Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.13-19.)
(Trial Tr., p.348, Ls.3-7.)
(Trial Tr., p.337, L.20 - p.339, L.14.)
7

she had significant motivation to lie, such that it would be inadmissible under I.RE.
803(2).

C.

The Statement Was Not Admitted As A Prior Inconsistent Statement
The State claims that this was not only an "excited utterance," but was

alternatively admitted as a prior consistent statement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.)
Yet the State also concedes that the district court only admitted the statement as an
"excited utterance."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16, n.4.)

While the district court

discussed with the parties the potential for admitting the statement as a prior consistent
statement, and proposed giving a limiting instruction if it did admit the statement under
that hearsay exception, the district court ultimately decided not to admit the statement
as a prior consistent statement, but ruled that the statement would come in without a
limiting instruction, as an "excited utterance." (Trial Tr., p.269, L.9 - p.270, L.14, p.342,
L.16 - p.343, L.7.) The district court read a proposed limiting instruction to the parties,
but the prosecutor asked the district court to reserve ruling on whether the statement
was admissible, as the prosecutor preferred that the statement come in under the
excited utterance exception, so that the statement would be substantive and no limiting
instruction would need to be given.

(Trial Tr., p.269, L.9 - p.270, L.22.)

During

Mr. Guyran's testimony, the district court interrupted his direct examination and said:
Okay. Counsel, I need to make a record here.
The defendant - or the witness has testified with regard to the demeanor
and behavior of Ms. Holland at the time this event occurred. The parties
have had discussion with the Court previously with regard to this
testimony, and the Court believes that the appropriate foundation has
been laid by the witness for a hearsay exception pursuant to Rule 803(2)
of an excited utterance, which is a statement relating to a startling event or
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condition made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement
caused by the event or condition.
The Court will, therefore, find that the evidence is admissible based upon
the foundation laid.
(Trial Tr., p.342, L.16 - p.343, L.7.) There is no basis for the State's argument that the
statement also came in as a prior consistent statement without a limiting instruction.
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 802, hearsay is inadmissible except as provided
by the Rules of Evidence. However, an out-of-court statement consistent with a
declarant's trial testimony, offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive," is not hearsay. I.R.E.
801 (d)(1 )(8).

Previously, the Idaho Supreme Court has implicitly held that the prior

consistent statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(8) are those "which preceded
any motive on the part of [the declarant] to lie." State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 895
(1999). In a recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court, State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
304 (2013), the Court explicitly held that "the Rule only permits introduction of out-ofcourt statements that were made prior to the time when the declarant would have a
motive to lie." Joy, 304 P.3d at 289 (finding that victim had motivation for lying prior to
her testimony at the preliminary hearing as parties were divorcing, thus the evidence
was not proper under Rule 801 (d)(1 )(8) because the preliminary hearing testimony did
not precede her motive to lie).

Here we are faced with a situation where both

individuals were seriously intoxicated, and had just wrecked a car.

Even in such an

intoxicated state, Ms. Holland would have been well aware that she would be facing
criminal prosecution for felony DUI should she admit that she was driving the car. As
noted in the Appellant's Brief, Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DU Is in the last
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ten years, thus she was facing felony charges if she was implicated as the driver of the
vehicle.

(PSI, p.3.)

Thus Ms. Holland undoubtedly had a motive to lie after the

accident, while in the presence of Mr. Guyran.

D.

The Admission Of The Testimonial Evidence Was Not Harmless Error
In setting forth the harmless error test, the State relied on the holding in State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669 (2010), in which the Court held: "The inquiry is whether,

beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence." (Respondent's Brief, p.19.) This is
incorrect. The appropriate standard for determining whether an objected-to error was
harmless was clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
222 (2010). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Perry,
150 Idaho at 227. To meet that burden, the State must "prove[] 'beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' " Id. at 221
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that:
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous . . . To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.
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Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court

"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
Because the error was objected to, Mr. Rhoads asserts that it is the State's
burden to prove that the admission of the evidence did not contribute to the conviction.
Mr. Rhoads maintains that the error was not harmless.

Although the State

claimed that the evidence of Mr. Rhoads' guilt was "overwhelming," this is not the
correct standard to determine whether the error was harmless and is factually incorrect
based on the facts adduced at trial in this case.

First, the State inaccurately

characterized the nature of the recorded conversation between Ms. Holland and
Mr. Rhoads while sitting in the police car as showing "that Rhoads created the 'Jeff'
story to cover the fact that he (Rhoads) had been driving the car when it crashed ... "
(Respondent's Brief, p.4.) This is not accurate. During the 40 minutes they were in the
police car, they discussed the fact that "Jeff" was driving and had left the scene of the
accident, they conversed about Ms. Holland's injured knee, Ms. Holland talked about
her attraction to the investigating police officer, and they even sang a song together.
(State's Ex., *-008.)
Second, the testimony at trial made it entirely unclear as to who was driving the
car. Ms. Kreisher testified that she did not see either Ms. Holland or Mr. Rhoads take
her keys, and did not see anyone driving her car. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.3-8.) Ms. Holland
had previously driven the car with Ms. Kreisher's permission. (Trial Tr., p.140, Ls.8-15.,
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p.153, L.24 - p.154, L.11, p.197, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland initially told Deputies Miller and
Hale that "Jeff" was driving and she was riding in the backseat when the accident
happened. 5

(Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.)

She told the nurse at her

physician's appointment three days after the accident that she didn't remember anything
at all from that day.

(Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.11-19.)

In the same visit, she told her

physician that the impact was in the front of the vehicle and that she was wearing a
seatbelt.

(Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288, L.2.)

Then she told the jury that when she

testified at Mr. Rhoads' preliminary hearing, she said that she remembered nothing
about the entire day. (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.7-22.) Ms. Holland said that she possibly was
driving when they first left Ms. Kreisher's house, but she didn't remember.

(Trial

Tr.,p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14.) At Mr. Rhoads' trial, Ms. Holland testified that
she remembered only bits and pieces of that day.

(Trial Tr. p.184, Ls.4-13.)

She

recalled looking for her cigarettes at one point, and at that time Mr. Rhoads was driving.
(Trial Tr. p.184, L.14 - p.185, L.8.) The next thing she remembered was trying to crawl
out of the passenger door. 6 (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Rhoads consistently maintained that "Jeff'' was driving the car.
Tr., p.253, Ls.16-18, p.260, Ls.22-25, p.312, Ls.9-16.)

(Trial

Ms. Holland's stories varied

Although Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads initially claimed a person named "Jeff" was
driving and that "Jeff" fled the scene, Ms. Holland later admitted that "Jeff'' was a
fictitious person. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.)
6 The driver's side door was not a valid method of exiting the vehicle, as it was up
against the barbed wire fence and was hanging over the cliff. (State's Ex. 1.)
5
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each time she was questioned and/or testified. 7

(PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.4-13,

p.195, Ls.7-22, p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14, p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.)
Finally, the physical evidence at trial was such that pictures of the vehicle's
interior after the accident reflected that the driver's seat was positioned close to the
steering wheel.

(Defense Ex., C.)

The pictures depicted the passenger's seat as

pushed nearly as far back as it could go. 8 (Defense Ex., C.) A pair of large shoes was
located on the passenger-side floor. (Defense Ex., D.) A pair of sunglasses identified
by Ms. Kreisher as belonging to Mr. Rhoads was located in the driver's side door
compartment.

(Trial Tr., p.135 Ls.11-25.)

The steering wheel of the car was never

tested for finger prints. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.6-15.) Although Mr. Rhoads was asked at
the scene whether his fingerprints would be on the steering wheel of the car and
Mr. Rhoads responded that they might be, on cross-examination, Deputy Hales
acknowledged that there are several other ways by which Mr. Rhoads' fingerprints could
have gotten on the steering wheel other than by driving the car. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.16 p.333, L.3.)
In sum, the testimony presented at trial did not conclusively establish who was
driving the car at the time of the accident as demonstrated by the fact that the jury
deliberated for over six hours before reaching a verdict.

(R., pp.98-99.) Ms. Holland

was not a credible witness as she had changed her story several times. The physical
evidence at the scene was inconclusive-some items appeared to indicate that

7

For example, Ms. Holland also misrepresented the facts when asked where she lived
(Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.6-16), when she lost her phone (Trial Tr., p.261, L.21 - p.262, L.3),
and whether she smoked or drank alcohol (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.13).
13

Ms. Holland was driving, while some made it seem as if Mr. Rhoads was driving. A
statement as to who was driving, such as the one by Mr. Guyran that was admitted over
the objections of defense counsel, was not harmless and almost certainly contributed to
the jury's verdict.
Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the statement, and Mr. Rhoads
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this
matter to the district court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new
trial.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2013.

\ /
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SALLY .
EY
J
Deputy State Appellate!"Public Defender

Mr. Rhoads is a tall man, approximately six feet tall. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.22 - p.315,
L.2, 338, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland is a petite woman at approximately five feet, five inches,
and 130 pounds. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.11-14, 337, Ls.24-25.)
8
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